

The Effect of Relabeling and Incentives on Retirement: Evidence from a Pension Reform

Jon Gruber, Ohto Kanninen, Satu Nivalainen, Terhi Ravaska and Roope
Uusitalo

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Finnish Pension Reform

- ▶ Relabeled earlier age as “normal” retirement age
- ▶ Relative small corresponding changes in financial incentives
 - ▶ But huge impact on retirement – within one year
 - ▶ Share retiring at old normal age fell from 74% to 17% in the first year
- ▶ Share retiring at new normal age rose from 9% to 20%, 30% and 38% in the following three years
- ▶ Relabeling effect is comparable to huge change in financial incentives
- ▶ Effects largest for those with less education and in best health
- ▶ Potential evidence of “mistakes” – larger impact on return to work

The Finnish pension system in 2004–2005

- ▶ Defined benefits system
- ▶ Compulsory contribution from earnings ($\sim 25\%$)
- ▶ Replacement rate $\sim 60\%$


Old-age pension system, three parts:

1. National pension
2. Earnings-related pension
3. (Private pensions)


Other programs

1. Disability insurance
2. Unemployment pension
3. Pre-reform: Individual early age retirement

2004



2005



Pension reform 2005

No change in labels in National Pension system.

Incentives:

	Before	After
Accrual %:	Ages 23-59 1.5%	Ages 18-52 1.5%
	Ages 60-65 2.5%	Ages 53-62 1.9%
		Ages 63-68 4.5%
Early claiming:	-0.4% for each month	-0.6% for each month
Delayed claiming:	0.6% for each month	0.4% for each month
Reference age:	65	63 (early); 68 (delayed)

Data

Dataset


- ▶ Centre for Pensions retirement data
- ▶ Years 2000 to 2014

Main sample


- ▶ Exclude those with a professional retirement age of below 65
- ▶ Exclude public sector
- ▶ Main sample: only earnings-related pension (accrual $> \sim 11,000$ euros per month, $N \sim 30,000$)

Descriptive statistics

The treatment



The treatment and effect, main sample



Regression framework

Cox proportional hazard

$$\lambda(t|X_{ip}) = \lambda_0(t) \exp(\beta_0 X_{i0} + \dots + \beta_p X_{ip}),$$

Continuous treatments in 2005:

- ▶ Immediate increase in pension wealth, % (income effect)
- ▶ Increase in marginal accrual rate, relative to accrued pension (substitution effect)

Binary treatment in 2005:

- ▶ Reach full retirement age in 12 months (relabeling effect)

Controls: Non-pension wealth decile, having been on sick leave at in 2000 to 2002, having a spouse, tertiary education, female, pension wealth at the beginning of the year in logs and marginal accrual rate assuming no reform in logs.

Sample: Those aged 62 to 65 at the start of the year in 2003–2005.

Table: Cox proportional hazard model regressions.

Sample	Earnings-related pension (1)
Effect of the reform (in 2005):	
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	0.107*** (0.0194)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0600*** (0.0107)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.034*** (0.122)
On sick leave at 62	0.0902*** (0.0329)
Has spouse	0.0740*** (0.0262)
Tertiary education	-0.0344 (0.0261)
Female	0.124*** (0.0269)
Pension wealth at the beginning of the year (logs)	0.549*** (0.0969)
Marg accrual rate, no reform (logs)	-0.392*** (0.0905)
Monthly age controls	Yes
Year controls	Yes
Individual controls	Yes
N	25,172

Main result

Compared to a baseline hazard of $\sim 5\%$

- ▶ A 1% increase in pension wealth increases retirement by 11%
- ▶ A 1% decline in accrual increases retirement by 6%
- ▶ Relabeling increases retirement by 664% – equivalent to a 20% increase in pension wealth or a 30% decrease in accrual!

Table: Cox proportional hazard model regressions, different samples.

Sample	Earnings-related pension (1)	0 to 0.5 threshold (2)
Effect of the reform (in 2005):		
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	0.107*** (0.0194)	0.150*** (0.0208)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0600*** (0.0107)	-0.0472*** (0.0038)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.034*** (0.122)	0.4352*** (0.1009)
On sick leave in 2000–2002	0.0877*** (0.0247)	0.1331*** (0.0412)
Has spouse	0.0740*** (0.0262)	0.0895*** (0.0395)
Tertiary education	-0.0344 (0.0261)	-0.1089*** (0.0426)
Female	0.124*** (0.0269)	-0.255*** (0.0400)
Pension wealth at the beginning of the year (logs)	0.549*** (0.0969)	-1.046*** (0.1030)
Marg accrual rate, no reform (logs)	-0.392*** (0.0905)	0.4090*** (0.0466)
Monthly age controls	Yes	Yes
Year controls	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
N	25,172	10,793

VARIABLES	(1) Main specification	(2) Interaction: tertiary education
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	0.0605*** (0.0170)	0.0746*** (0.0211)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0459*** (0.00900)	-0.0411*** (0.0111)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.183*** (0.114)	2.441*** (0.142)
Immediate increase in pension wealth, tertiary, %		-0.0285 (0.0365)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, tertiary, % of pension		-0.0140 (0.0190)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months, tertiary		-0.641*** (0.245)
Pension wealth at the beginning of the year (logs)	0.744*** (0.0858)	0.780*** (0.118)
Marg accrual rate, no reform (logs)	-0.439*** (0.0791)	-0.454*** (0.110)
Monthly age controls	Yes	Yes
Year controls	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,172	25,172

	Main specification	Interaction: Sickness in 2000–2002	Interaction: Death before age 74
Effect of the reform (in 2005):			
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	0.107*** (0.0194)	0.102*** (0.0226)	0.104*** (0.0205)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0600*** (0.0107)	-0.0812*** (0.0141)	-0.0585*** (0.0112)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.034*** (0.122)	2.086*** (0.141)	2.025*** (0.128)
Immediate increase in pension wealth, sick pop., %		0.0173 (0.0443)	
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension, sick pop.		0.0729*** (0.0229)	
Reach full retirement age in 12 months, sick pop.		-0.174 (0.278)	
Immediate increase in pension wealth, early death, %			0.0558 (0.0659)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, early death, % of pension			-0.0205 (0.0427)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months, early death			-0.0380 (0.404)
On sick leave in 2000–2002	0.0877*** (0.0247)	0.144 (1.365)	0.0823*** (0.0262)
Died before age 74			1.725 (1.494)
Monthly age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,172	25,172	25,172

	Main specification (1)	Interaction: wealth by tercile (2)
Effect of the reform (in 2005):		
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	0.108*** (0.0194)	0.101*** (0.0342)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0594*** (0.0107)	-0.0548*** (0.0208)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.031*** (0.121)	2.229*** (0.217)
Immediate increase in pension wealth, 2nd tercile, %		-0.000714 (0.0242)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, 2nd tercile, % of pension		0.00829 (0.0133)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months, 2nd tercile		-0.0996 (0.153)
Immediate increase in pension wealth, 3rd tercile, %		0.00425 (0.0158)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, 3rd tercile, % of pension		-0.0113 (0.00914)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months, 3rd tercile		-0.105 (0.0987)
Pension wealth at the beginning of the year (logs)	0.742*** (0.0858)	1.052*** (0.155)
Marg accrual rate, no reform (logs)	-0.440*** (0.0791)	-0.691*** (0.142)
Monthly age controls	Yes	Yes
Year controls	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,172	25,172

Return to labor market in 3 years vs retiring

Dependent variable: Retiring				
Sample	Full sample	Sick in 2000–2002	Wealth 1st tercile	Below tertiary education
Effect of the reform (in 2005):				
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	0.107*** (0.0194)	0.1260*** (0.0382)	0.0996*** (0.0343)	0.1362*** (0.0248)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0600*** (0.0107)	-0.0087 (0.00195)	-0.0569*** (0.021)	-0.0467*** (0.0129)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.034*** (0.122)	1.894*** (0.2399)	2.240*** (0.2173)	2.232*** (0.1498)
N	25,172	6,308	8,391	17,108

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$


Dependent variable: Returning to labor market in three years (25% of previous income)				
Sample	Full sample	Sick in 2000–2002	Wealth 1st tercile	Below tertiary education
Effect of the reform (in 2005):				
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	-0.0049 (0.0477)	-0.0093 (0.1021)	-0.0463 (0.081)	-0.0501 (0.0621)
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-0.0429* (0.0257)	-0.04457 (0.0639)	0.0353 (0.044)	-0.0405 (0.0350)
Reach full retirement age in 12 months	2.505*** (0.302)	2.257*** (0.646)	3.003*** (0.525)	3.166*** (0.405)
N	25,172	6,308	8,391	17,108

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Anticipation effect

- ▶ Reform law passed August 2004
- ▶ Information letters already in beginning of 2004, discussions earlier
- ▶ Anticipation might have caused retirement before reform was enacted
- ▶ We also control expected incentive effects of the reform in 2004

The treatment and effect, anticipation



Conclusion

Labels and incentives matter

- ▶ Relabeling effect equal to income effect of 20 percentage point change in income level
- ▶ Relabeling effect equal to substitution effect of 30 percentage point change in marginal accrual rate

Mechanisms

- ▶ Reference-dependent utility
 - ▶ Brown et al. (2013), Merkle et al. (2016), Seibold (2017), Behaghel & Blau (2012)
- ▶ Social norms
- ▶ Mistakes
- ▶ Symmetry/generalizability?

Extensions

- ▶ Optimality/mistakes/return to work
- ▶ Effects at particular professions/firms
- ▶ Spouse effects?

	Relabeling, aged 62 to 64 at start of year (Relabeling)				No relabeling, aged 64 to 65 at start of year (No relabeling)			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
2003 (Control year)								
Female	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Tertiary education	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
Died before age 74	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
On sick leave at 62	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
Annual earnings (thousand euros)	25.95	24.87	0.00	307.15	26.00	27.04	0.00	272.29
Pension wealth (thousand euros)	582.69	293.63	314.08	4497.85	556.87	277.56	38.44	3409.08
Marg accrual rate, no reform (thousand euros)	51.27	32.75	15.61	397.76	45.79	23.84	18.50	
2004 (Control year)								
Female	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Tertiary education	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
Died before age 74	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
On sick leave at 62	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
Annual earnings (thousand euros)	27.20	23.97	0.00	282.67	27.68	26.12	0.00	184.05
Pension wealth (thousand euros)	602.44	324.96	318.33	5638.94	561.61	269.17	308.24	3855.00
Marg accrual rate, no reform (thousand euros)	53.11	31.84	15.76	433.59	46.75	27.99	18.05	
2005 (Reform year)								
female	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Tertiary education	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Died before age 74	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
On sick leave at 62	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00
Annual earnings (thousand euros)	31.21	32.52	0.04	587.53	27.52	23.11	0.03	156.94
Pension wealth (thousand euros)	617.95	345.75	10.24	5492.06	581.62	312.74	313.60	4280.10
Marg accrual rate, no reform (thousand euros)	55.30	33.50	17.66	387.70	48.20	25.23	20.95	228.43
Immediate increase in pension wealth, %	7.68	1.29	4.81	9.60	2.11	1.34	0.01	4.79
Increase in marginal accrual rate, % of pension	-1.15	2.14	-4.80	39.73	-1.95	2.76	-7.07	14.82